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Abstract
Is the textbook result that Solomonoff’s universal posterior converges to the true
posterior for all Martin-Lo¨f random sequences true?
Universal induction. Induction problems can be phrased as sequence prediction tasks.
This is, for instance, obvious for time series prediction, but also includes classification
tasks. Having observed data xt at times t<n, the task is to predict the t-th symbol xt from
sequence x=x1...xt−1. The key concept to attack general induction problems is Occam’s
razor and to a less extent Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations. The former/latter
may be interpreted as to keep the simplest/all theories consistent with the observations
x1...xt−1 and to use these theories to predict xt. Solomonoff [Sol64, Sol78] formalized and
combined both principles in his universal prior M(x) which assigns high/low probability
to simple/complex environments, hence implementing Occam and Epicurus. M(x) is
defined as the probability that a universal Turing machine U outputs a string starting
with x, when provided with fair coin flips on the input tape.
Posterior convergence. Solomonoff’s [Sol78] central result is that if the probability
µ(xt|x1...xt−1) of observing xt at time t, given past observations x1...xt−1 is a computable
function, then the universal posterior Mt :=M(xt|x1...xt−1) converges (rapidly!) with
µ-probability 1 (w.p.1) for t→∞ to the true posterior µt := µ(xt|x1...xt−1), hence M
represents a universal predictor in case of unknown µ. Convergence of Mt to µt w.p.1
tells us that Mt is close to µt for sufficiently large t for “almost all” sequences x1:∞ (we
abbreviate x1:n := x1...xn). It says nothing about whether convergence is true for any
particular sequence (of measure 0).
Martin-Lo¨f randomness is the standard notion to capture convergence for individual
sequences and is closely related to Solomonoff’s universal prior. Levin gave a characteri-
zation equivalent to Martin-Lo¨f’s (M.L.) original definition [Lev73]:
A sequence x1:∞ is µ-random (in the sense of M.L.) iff there is a constant c such that
M(x1:n)≤c·µ(x1:n) for all n.
One can show that a µ-random sequence x1:∞ passes all thinkable effective randomness
tests, e.g. the law of large numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm, etc. In particular,
the set of all µ-random sequences has µ-measure 1.
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Open problem. An interesting open question is whetherMt converges to µt (in difference
or ratio) individually for all Martin-Lo¨f random sequences. Clearly, Solomonoff’s result
shows that convergence may at most fail for a set of sequences with µ-measure zero. A
convergence result for µ-random sequences is particularly interesting and natural in this
context, since µ-randomness can be defined in terms of M itself (see above).
Proof attempts. Attempts to convert the convergence results w.p.1 to effective µ-
randomness tests fail, since Mt is not lower semi-computable. In [LV97, Th.5.2.2] and
[VL00, Th.10] the following Theorem is stated:
“Let µ be a positive recursive measure. If the length of y is fixed and the length of x
grows to infinity, then M(y|x)/µ(y|x)→1 with µ-probability one. The infinite sequences
ω with prefixes x satisfying the displayed asymptotics are precisely [‘⇒’ and ‘⇐’] the
µ-random sequences.”
While convergence w.p.1 is correct if appropriately interpreted,1 the proof that
convergence holds for µ-random sequences is incomplete: “M(x1:n) ≤ c ·µ(x1:n)∀n ⇒
limn→∞M(x1:n)/µ(x1:n) exists” has been used, but not proven, and may indeed be wrong.
Vovk [Vov87] shows that for two finitely computable semi-measures µ and ρ, and x1:∞ be-
ing µ- and ρ-random that ρt/µt→1. IfM were recursive, then this would implyMt/µt→1
for every µ-random sequence x1:∞, since every sequence is M -random. Since M is not
recursive Vovk’s theorem cannot be applied and it is not obvious how to generalize it. So
the question of individual convergence remains open.
Conclusions. Contrary to what was believed before, the question of posterior conver-
gence Mt/µt→ 1 (also Mt→µt) for all µ-random sequences is still open. In [Hut03] we
introduce a new flexible notion of randomness which contains Martin-Lo¨f randomness as
a special case. This notion is used to show that standard proof attempts of Mt/µt
M.L.−→1
based on so called dominance only must fail, indicating that this problem may be a hard
one.
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1The formulation of the Theorem is quite misleading in general: First, for off-sequence y convergence
w.p.1 does not hold (xy must be demanded to be a prefix of x1:∞). Second, the proof of ‘⇐’ has
loopholes (see main text). Last, ‘⇒’ is given without proof and is probably wrong. Also the assertion
in [LV97, Th.5.2.1] that St converges to zero faster than 1/t cannot be made, since St may not decrease
monotonically.
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